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FOREWORD
The Editors and Staff of the Review are pleased to present in Volume
22's last issue an ecelectic assortment of Articles and student-written
commentary. In our first Article, Professor William J. Rands studies the
federal tax treatment of incorporations. The work provides tax counsel
with a practical guide through this complex area, replete with clear hypothetical explanations as well as theoretical and policy discussions.
Critically, the author perceives no major flaw in the system and its focal
point, Internal Revenue Code section 351; indeed, he applauds this Code
section as being uncharacteristically clear. Nevertheless, Professor
Rands finds one aspect of section 351-non-recognition treatment for a
shareholder who transfers property to a controlled corporation in exchange for debt securities-inconsistent with the Code's reorganization
rules which consider a change in position from equity to debt a taxable
event. Although inconsistent with the reorganization rules, the author
urges that Congress only with great caution convert into a taxable event
such a receipt of securities in an incorporation because incorporations
then effectively would be taxed on a regular basis.
Our second Article considers California evidence law regarding expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases. The author, Professor Linda
E. Carter, explores the current Kelly-Frye standard developed by the California Supreme Court. This standard holds that in any type of case a
new scientific technique invoked by an expert witness must be generally
accepted within the relevant scientific community to be admissible. In
the child sexual abuse context, the community of behavioral psychologists must accept as valid any new diagnostic technique upon which an
expert bases a determination that a child has been sexually abused. The
author urges that the California courts reject exclusive reliance on the
Kelly-Frye standard in child sexual abuse cases. In Professor Carter's
view, the ability of experts to easily manipulate applications of psychological diagnostic techniques has yielded hopelessly inconsistent results
as to their admissibility. The author urges that the courts adopt a more
traditional, generalized evidentiary standard-one that downgrades the
Kelly-Frye inquiry to being just one of several factors in the admissibility
analysis.
Practitioner Michael B. Landau in our third Article examines the
controversy over the colorization of renowned black-and-white motion
pictures. The Article reviews the Copyright Act of 1976 as it may apply

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:vii

to film colorization and discusses current attempts to resolve whether
and to what extent a colorized movie may be copyrighted by the
colorizer. The author concludes that present copyright law does not adequately address the issue of colorization and proposes amendments to the
Copyright Act to clarify the status of colorized works.
In addition to these three Articles, we also present four studentwritten pieces in this issue. In the first of these, staff writer Jeffrey Farley
Keller comments on civil aiding and abetting liability under SEC Rule
10b'5. The lower federal courts have developed a three-part test for determining liability for aiding and abetting primary violations of the federal securities laws. The elements include the presence of primary
violation of the securities laws, knowledge of that crime, and assistance
in the wrong. In the absence of a Supreme Court pronouncement on the
test, however, the courts have diverged on the quanta of knowledge and
assistance necessary for liability. The author proposes that the courts
adopt a "sliding-scale, flexible-factor" analysis which for liability requires varying degrees of knowledge and assistance depending on factors
such as the existence of a duty to disclose information. The author concludes that this test would provide flexible yet reliable guidance to courts
and securities industry participants alike.
In his Comment staff writer Jeremy J.F. Gray examines the role
implied contractual indemnity has played in allocating liability among
multiple defendants. The doctrine is invoked when in the absence of an
express indemnification clause a court implies into a contract the duty of
one party to indemnify the other for damages paid out by the indemnified
party as a result of the indemnitor's negligent performance of an express
promise. The author argues that the adoption of comparative indemnity
has rendered implied contractual indemnity obsolete. The author further
argues that the doctrine thwarts the effective operation of statutes
designed to encourage settlements because under existing statutes settling
defendants remain vulnerable to indemnity suits by implied indemnitees.
The Comment recommends that all jurisdictions eliminate implied contractual indemnity or, at the very least, bar non-settling defendants from
invoking the doctrine to sue settling defendants. The author concludes
by proposing specific amendments to New York and California statutes
that include implied contractual indemnity among the causes of action
barred against settling defendants.
In the first of two Notes in this issue, staff writer Tobin Lippert
considers the California Supreme Court decision, Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Cos. In that case, the court held that section
790.03 of the California Insurance Code does not provide third-party
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claimants a private right of action for bad faith against insurance companies. The decision overruled Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior
Court,the 1979 landmark decision in which the same court had held that
third-party claimants could indeed directly sue insurers for violations of
the Insurance Code. The author examines in detail the court's policyladen reasons for overruling Royal Globe as well as its treatment of the
principles of stare decisis. The author discusses the wide-ranging implications of Moradi-Shalal,and concludes by recommending that the California Legislature reinstate the Royal Globe holding.
In the final piece in this final issue of Volume 22, staff writer Donna
A. Golem analyzes PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Mississippi, a case in which
the Supreme Court of the United States held that upon attaining statehood each state received title to all waterways and lands under water
influenced by the tides. The effect of the decision is that a state can include within the property it holds in trust for the public all tidal waters
and their underlying lands, whether or not navigable. The author believes that the Court's decision was unprecedented because never before
had it ruled that states held title to inland, non-navigable waters. The
author argues that the decision has great potential to upset the settled
expectations of private landowners who under prior law had clear title to
their inland, non-navigable waters whether or not influenced by the tide.
The Note concludes by urging states not to adopt the Phillips Court's
"ebb and flow" test to delineate the scope of their public trust lands, but
instead to use the time-honored "navigability-in-fact" test. Alternatively, the author proposes that states limit their public trust holdings to
clearly appropriate lands by carefully considering the purposes of holding lands in trust before declaring trust title.
The Editors

